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Deity and Creation in the Christian Doctrine
Kent R. Lehnhof

In a recent essay Joseph Wittreich has characterized Paradise Lost as an “arena for conflict, a
battleground for warring values” wherein contrary
theologies struggle for supremacy (244). In many
ways, Wittreich’s description of the epic aptly
applies to the author. There has never been a time
when critics have not argued about Milton’s
alleged orthodoxy or heterodoxy. For over three
hundred years, readers have endeavored to locate
Milton either inside or outside of orthodox
Anglicanism. In the last decade, William B.
Hunter has stoked this critical controversy,
attacking the provenance of the Christian Doctrine
in order to situate Milton “closer to the great
traditions of Christianity, no longer associated
with a merely eccentric fringe” (166). Opposing
Hunter’s idea of an orthodox Milton, Janel
Mueller points out that in Milton’s prose, the
word “heresy” often has positive rather than
pejorative connotations. She claims that Milton
frequently employs the word “in its neutral pagan
and Jewish senses of a freely chosen, energetically
arrived-at doctrine that in turn constitutes a
school, whether of philosophy or religion” (24).

Mueller maintains that at times Milton uses the
term in such a way as to make “heresy”
synonymous with “true religion” (26). Drawing
upon Mueller’s work, Stephen B. Dobranski and
John P. Rumrich have suggested that Milton
believes heresy to be bound up with the pursuit
of truth. They have maintained that for Milton
“heresy” implies a rational process that ultimately produces conviction and instigates
future inquiry. The process of heresy may
provoke the formation of a new school of
thought, or the deviation from an existing one,
whether in religion or philosophy. Hence
heresy evolves into orthodoxy, from which
new heresies eventually depart. (2)

According to Dobranski and Rumrich, Milton
explicitly recognizes that “heresy and orthodoxy
beget and define one another” and that he
“accept[s] this process as inevitable and even
desirable” (2).
Building upon the recent scholarship of
Mueller, Dobranski, and Rumrich, this essay

MILTON QUARTERLY
continues to explore the interplay of orthodoxy
and heresy in Milton’s individual theology,
attending particularly to Milton’s understanding
of the Godhead. In order to establish the
orthodox doctrine that “begets” and “defines”
Milton’s own thought, I initiate this examination
by turning to the Nicene Creed and the writings
of Saint Augustine.
In the year 325 in Nicaea of Bithynia,
Constantine convened the first-ever ecumenical
council to address the division created within the
Church by an increasingly vociferous faction that
challenged the divinity of the Son of God. This
faction, led by Arius, focused on the fact that the
Son, unlike the Father, was begotten. According
to Arius, the Son’s begotten status has substantial
effects: because the Son is begotten, the Son’s
substance must differ from that of the unbegotten Father. As Arius asserts in Thalia: “The
Father is alien to the Son in substance …. The
substances of the Father and of the Son and of
the Holy Spirit are different and have no share in
each other” (qtd. in Kelly 236). Arius explains
that this difference in substance necessarily entails
a difference in essence. And a difference in essence, in turn, indicates a difference in divinity.
Since the Son does not share in the Father’s
divine substance, the Son cannot share in the
Father’s divine status—the Son cannot be “true
God.” In this way, Arius’s denigration of the Son
is implicitly predicated upon the assumption that
deity derives from substance. The Father is the
one true God by virtue of his divine substance;
the Son is not the one true God because he lacks
this divine substance. Because the Son does not
possess the Father’s substance, the Son cannot be
believed to possess the Father’s divinity. It seems
that for Arius deity depends upon and derives
from the substance of which a being is composed.
The creed that the Nicene Council authored in
opposition to Arius’s outlook appears to share
this conceptualization. At first, the Council attempted to assert the Son’s divinity by exclaiming
that he is “from God” or “indivisibly God.” As J.
N. D. Kelly reports, however,
whatever turns of phrase were proposed—that
the Son was “from God,” that He was “the
true Power and Image of the Father,” that He
was “indivisibly in God,” etc.—the Arians
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managed somehow to twist them round so as
to chime in with their own notions. In the end,
says St. Athanasius, there was nothing for it
but to interpolate the precise, utterly unambiguous, but non-scriptural, clauses FROM
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE FATHER and OF ONE
SUBSTANCE WITH THE FATHER. (213)

Consequently, the portion of the creed concerning the Son’s divinity was finalized in the following form:
We believe … in one Lord Jesus Christ, the
Son of God, begotten from the Father, onlybegotten, that is, from the substance of the
Father, God from God, light from light, true
God from true God, begotten not made, of
one substance with the Father. (qtd. in Kelly
215)

To exclude Arianism, the Council focused on the
Son’s substance. Declaring the Son’s substance to
be identical to the Father’s, the Council considered itself to be simultaneously declaring the
Son’s divinity to be identical to the Father’s. In
short, the Council’s counter-claim regarding the
Son’s status as God reduces itself to an affirmation of the Son’s substantial similarity to God.
As Kelly claims: “The full weight of the orthodox
reply to Arianism was concentrated” in the phrase
“of one substance with the Father.” This phrase
completely traversed the Arian position by
asserting the full deity of the Son. The Son, it
implied, shared the very being or essence of
the Father. He was therefore fully divine:
whatever belonged to or characterized the
Godhead belonged to and characterized Him.
(238)

As Kelly concludes, the Nicene Creed “affirmed
the full divinity of the Son in language which
implied, if it did not explicitly assert, the doctrine
of identity of substance between Him and the
Father” (243). Equating similarity of substance
with similarity of divinity, the Nicene Council
appears to assent to Arius’s assumption that deity
depends upon substantial composition.
In Augustine’s orthodox examination of the
godhead the substance-driven definition of deity
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underlying the Nicene Creed seems to be even
more explicit. In De Trinitate Augustine straightforwardly declares that “God is without doubt a
substance” and argues that this substance is
utterly unlike the substance of other existents or
objects (5.2.3). Adopting a substantial idea of
deity, Augustine explains that all entities composed of divine substance—which Augustine
tellingly labels “the substance of the Godhead”
(1.8.15)—are, of necessity, gods. Because the
Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost possess the
same substance, they must all be recognized as
gods. As Augustine instructs:
The power of the same substance in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is so great that
everything which is said of the individual person in reference to Himself may also be said
of them together. … For as the Father is God,
the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God,
and no one doubts that these words are spoken according to the substance. (5.8.9)

In the same way that the Nicene Creed implicitly
defines deity in terms of substantial composition,
Augustine argues that the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Spirit are God “according to the substance.” Augustine reiterates this idea of divinity
when claiming that the Father, the Son, and the
Holy Ghost are utterly equal: “What is said about
each one in this Trinity is likewise said about all of
them, on account of the inseparable activity of
the one and the same substance” (1.12.25).
Equality in divinity derives from equality in
substance. Augustine, like Arius and the Nicene
Fathers before him, understands deity to be a
consequence of essential composition. It is this
understanding that David Cunningham signifies
when claiming that early patristic thought about
the Trinity bases itself in a “metaphysics of
substance” (25).
This substantial understanding of divinity also
informs Augustine’s own disagreement with Arius. Augustine recognizes that Arianism begins
with the belief that the Son’s begottenness entails
a difference in substance from the unbegotten
Father. Significantly, Augustine does not disagree
that a difference in substance between Father and
Son would produce a difference in divinity. He
readily acknowledges that “the Son is in no res-

pect equal to the Father, if He is found to be unequal in anything pertaining to the substance”
(6.4.6). Augustine, however, contends that the
terms “begotten” and “Son” have no relation to
substance. These terms only outline relationships:
The Father is only called the Father because
He has a Son, the Son must, therefore, be only
called the Son because He has a Father ….
These terms are not said according to the substance …. Consequently, although to be the
Father and to be the Son are two different
things, still there is no difference in their substance, because the names, Father and Son, do
not refer to the substance but to the relation.
(5.5.6)

In other words, “although begotten is different
from unbegotten, still it does not indicate a difference in substance” (5.7.8).
Having established to his satisfaction that the
scriptures do not describe a difference in substance between the Father and the Son, Augustine
uses a substance-based notion of deity to argue
the exact opposite position. Citing Phillipians 2.6
(“He thought it not robbery to be equal to God”),
Augustine asserts that the Son’s stated equality
with the Father necessarily indicates a similarity of
substance: “The Apostle calls [the Son] equal.
Therefore, the Son is equal to the Father in everything, and is of one and the same substance”
(6.4.6). Speaking of the Son, Augustine affirms:
“He is of the one and the same substance with
the Father, and consequently He is not only God
but also the true God” (1.6.9). Like the framers of
the Nicene Creed, Augustine suggests that deity
derives from substance. One is “not only God
but also the true God” when one possesses “the
substance of Godhead.”
The substantial understanding of divinity that
seems to shape the orthodox positions of Nicaea
and of Augustine, however, fails to function in
Milton’s theological framework. As a materialist
monist, Milton maintains that there is only one
substance in the universe: the “substantia” of the
Father. It is out of this single substance that all
things are created. According to Milton: “God
produced all things not out of nothing but out of
himself” (6.310).1 This posture of materialist
monism precludes Milton from participating in
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the Nicene and Augustinian formulations of
divinity. As Michael Bauman observes: “Within
the orthodox trinitarian scheme … the divine
ousia is unequivocally the possession of Godhead
only, and is in no way common to beings not
themselves absolutely divine.” Within Milton’s
theological framework, however, “those who
possess [the Father’s] ‘substantia’ are not necessarily God, because in Milton’s universe all created
things whatsoever, from archangels down to aardvarks and anthracite coal, share the same
‘substantia.’” Bauman is completely correct when
he concludes that in a schema where all things are
created out of the substance of the Father, simply
sharing God’s substance does not entail any type
of divine metaphysical status. For Milton, substantial similarity to God cannot serve as “the
infallible hallmark of true divinity” (86–87).
Since divinity cannot be established by reference to a divine composition, Milton’s materialist
monism requires that deity be defined otherwise.
For Milton, this alternative definition seems to be
grounded in acts of creation. A god is not a god
because of his substantial composition but
because of his ability to create. In other words,
divinity for Milton derives from creation.
This understanding of deity begins to take
shape in the second chapter of the Christian Doctrine, where Milton takes up the monumental subject “Of God.” In the first sentence of the chapter, Milton gestures toward atheism, acknowledging: “That there is a God, many deny” (6.130).
Immediately assailing this opinion, Milton points
to the created universe:
It is indisputable that all the things which exist
in the world, created in perfection of beauty
and order for some definite purpose, and that
a good one, provide proof that a supreme
creative being existed before the world, and
had a definite purpose of his own in all created
things. (6.130)

According to Milton, the most powerful witness
of the existence of God is the existence of “created things.” Yet Milton’s response suggests that
creation’s relation to God is not simply evidentiary. Replacing the initial term “God” with the
subsequent term “supreme creative being,” the
passage implies that creative acts do not merely
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affirm God but might actually constitute God. In
other words, creation not only points to God but
in some sense produces Him.
The idea that God is to some degree created by
his status vis-à-vis creation is informed by the
conviction that no creature can ever acquit itself
of the obligation it owes to its creator. The
creature is forever indebted to the creator for
bestowing upon it the gift of life or being. As a
result of this eternal debt, every act of creation
produces relationships of dominance and subordination: a creator will always rule over his or
her creations. Simply put, authorship endows
authority: what one makes, one masters. This
genesis-driven hierarchy, of course, speaks to
God’s sovereignty. As Milton affirms: “God is the
first, absolute and sole cause of all things”
(6.307). Because God has created everything, he
is authorized to rule everything. His sovereignty
is a direct result of his generative ability.
And the exclusive nature of his sovereignty is
a direct result of the exclusive part he plays in
creation. Citing scripture at the start of the chapter entitled “Of the Creation,” Milton strings together several biblical passages, all of which give
God the Father exclusive credit for the creation.
As Milton arranges and excerpts them, they read:
Job ix. 8: who alone spreads out the heavens; Isa.
xliv. 24: I, Jehovah, make all things, I alone spread
out the heavens, and I stretch forth the earth by myself,
and xlv. 6, 7: that from the sun’s rising and from its
setting the nations may know that there is none beside
me, that I am Jehovah, and there is none else: that I
form the light and create the darkness. (6.300)

Milton concludes from these scriptures that since
God is alone in creation, he must—of necessity—be alone in authority: “If such things as
common sense and accepted idiom exist at all,
then these words preclude the possibility not only
of there being any other God, but also of there
being any person, of any kind whatever, equal to
him” (6.300). According to Milton, God’s singular status as god is incontrovertibly established by
his singular status as creator.
The link between God’s authorship and his
ensuing authority is structurally registered in the
outlay of the chapters of the Christian Doctrine. It
is not insignificant that the chapter detailing “Of
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God’s Providence, or His Universal Government
of Things” immediately follows the chapter
treating “Of the Creation.” In Milton’s text, as in
Milton’s theology, God’s universal creation
precedes and licenses God’s universal government. The thesis statement of the chapter on
universal government further reinforces the
connection between sovereignty and creation, defining God’s general government of the universe
as “that by which GOD THE FATHER VIEWS AND
PRESERVES ALL CREATED THINGS” (6.326). The
important qualification of this exclamation (not
“all things” but rather “all created things”) hints at
the way in which authority is a function of
authorship in Milton’s ideological framework.2
Because authority arises from authorship, it is
crucial that Milton’s God is the creator of all
things, but it is equally important that he is not
himself a creature. In order to be absolutely
supreme, God must be free of the primary debt
all creatures owe their creator: he must be selfbegotten. Were he not, he would necessarily be
subordinate to his creator, and this subordinate
status would compromise his utter authority. As
Milton writes: “All this is so obvious in itself that
it really needs no explanation. It is quite clear …
that a being who is not self-existent cannot be a
God” (6.218). God’s sovereignty, then, also arises
from the fact that his self-existent status frees him
from the claims of a superior creator. As the only
uncreated existent in the universe, God is the only
entity without a superior, thus, the only supreme
being.
In short, God’s self-existent status releases him
from fealty to a superior being and his all-creating
identity affords him the obedience of all that
exists. These two criteria—ontological independence and exclusive authorship—form the basis
of Milton’s notion of God. They are the central
attributes that Milton points to when defining
supernatural supremacy: “For a supreme God is
self-existent, but a God who is not self-existent,
who did not beget but was begotten, is not a first
cause but an effect, and is therefore not a supreme God” (6.263–64). The supreme being, according to Milton, is supreme by virtue of his
status as a non-begotten begetter. And this supremacy translates into absolute dominion: the
creator of all things living is allowed to rule all
living things.

The rigor with which Milton adheres to this
principle of authorship/authority is illustrated by
his discussion in the Christian Doctrine of the
precise nature of the Son’s divinity. Given the
significance Milton places on processes of
creation, it is not at all surprising that he begins
the chapter “Of the Son of God” by examining
the Son’s status vis-à-vis generation. Addressing
the idea that the Son is, like the Father, eternally
present and uncreated, Milton reports: “Not a
scrap of real evidence for the eternal generation
of the Son can be found in the whole of
scripture” (6.206). To the contrary: “It is as plain
as it could possibly be that God voluntarily
created or generated or produced the Son before
all things” (6.211). Once it is established that the
Son is begotten or made, Milton’s theological
assessment of the Son’s divinity is determined. In
keeping with the creator/creature relationship
outlined above, Milton asserts that the Son who
owes his existence to the Father must for this
very reason owe eternal obeisance to the Father.
Because the Son is forever indebted to the Father,
he is and will always be subordinate to the Father.
The Son’s inability to claim ontological
independence prevents the Son from occupying
the position of supreme God because, as Milton
declares: “A God cannot be begotten at all”
(6.211). Citing the passage in Revelations 3.14
that identifies Christ as “the beginning of God’s
creation,” Milton deduces: “That can only mean
that he was the first of the things which God
created. How, then, can he be God himself?”
(6.303).
As a result of the Son’s status as a begotten
being, Milton refuses to acknowledge the Son as
a God:
Since therefore the Son derives his essence
from the Father, the Son undoubtedly comes
after the Father not only in rank but also in
essence.… The name “Son,” upon which my
opponents chiefly build their theory of his
supreme divinity, is in fact itself the best
refutation of their theory. For a supreme God
is self-existent, but a God who is not selfexistent, who did not beget but was begotten,
is not a first cause but an effect, and is therefore not a supreme God. (6.263–64)

MILTON QUARTERLY
Because the Son is not a supreme God, Milton
denies him the attributes associated with divinity,
such as omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence—although Milton acknowledges that the
Father at times endows the Son with these divine
attributes. Marshaling scriptural evidence in favor
of this finding, Milton asserts:
We are taught about the Son’s divine nature as
something distinct from and clearly inferior to
the Father’s nature. For to be with God, and
to be from God; to be God, and to be in the
bosom of God the Father; to be God, and to
be from God; to be the one, invisible God,
and to be the only begotten and visible, are
quite different things—so different that they
cannot apply to one and the same essence.
The fact that he derived his glory, even in his
divine nature, before the foundations of the
world were laid, not from himself but from the
Father, who gave it because he loved him,
makes it obvious that he is inferior to the
Father. (6.273)

In short, Milton’s investigation into the divine
nature of the Son of God is driven by the fact
that the Son cannot claim to be self-begotten. As
Milton relentlessly applies the idea that authority
arises from authorship, his belief that the Son is a
begotten being eventuates in an espousal of an
heretical anti-Trinitarianism.3
John Rumrich reminds us of the risks involved
in advocating this type of anti-Trinitarian ideology, observing that “in England at least eight
antitrinitarian heretics were burned at the stake
from 1548 to 1612” (86). One of the last of these
martyrs was Bartholomew Legate, a young man
whom King James personally interrogated.
According to one historical account, James was so
angered by Legate’s doctrinal opinions that he
flew into a rage, lashed out at the boy with his
foot, and commanded that Legate be removed
from the room. Although the burnings were
discontinued after Legate’s demise, the cessation
was not a sign of increased tolerance: King James
simply preferred, in the words of Thomas Fuller,
that “Heretics hereafter … should silently and
privately waste themselves away in Prison rather
than to grace them and amuze others with the
solemnity of a public Execution” (qtd. In
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Rumrich 87). Christopher Hill relates that the
Westminster Assembly of Divines did not share
James’s anti-execution position. In 1648 they
recommended that the anti-Trinitarian John Bidle
be put to death. Although Bidle avoided
immediate execution, he was imprisoned,
banished, and re-imprisoned, eventually dying in
his prison cell (175). Rumrich points to the
persistence of this anti-Trinitarian persecution by
noting that William Whitson, Newton’s successor
at Cambridge, was removed from his chair when
his ideas of the Son’s inferiority were made
known (87). Christopher Hill confirms the
continuance of this religious tyranny, observing
that “a man was hanged for denying the Trinity as
late as 1699” (176). These instances would seem
to endorse Rumrich’s conclusion that professions
of the Son’s inferior status “provoked authorities
across seventeenth-century Europe as no other
heresy could” (87).
Milton’s theological treatise exhibits an
awareness of the fact that its approach to the Son
is unorthodox and, as a result, dangerously provocative. In the “Epistle” that introduces the text,
Milton expresses the hope “that all my readers
will be sympathetic, and will avoid prejudice and
malice, even though they see at once that many of
the views I have published are at odds with
certain conventional opinions” (6.121). Admitting
that these views might be considered heretical,
Milton even goes so far as to embrace the label of
heretic: “If this is heresy, I confess, as does Paul
in Acts xxiv.14, that following the way which is called
heresy I worship the God of my fathers, believing all things
that are written in the law and the prophets” (6.124). It
becomes clear as we approach the chapter on the
Son that Milton’s understanding of the Trinity
makes up the main of this acknowledged unorthodoxy. Although no other chapter in the
Christian Doctrine bears a preface, Milton precedes
the chapter “Of the Son of God” with a preamble
that baldly sets out to defuse the anger he
suspects the chapter will incite. Forewarning the
reader that he is now going to talk about the Son
of God, Milton exclaims:
I do not see how anyone who calls himself a
Protestant or a member of the Reformed
Church, and who acknowledges the same rule
of faith as myself, could be offended with me
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for this, especially as I am not trying to
browbeat anyone, but am merely pointing out
what I consider the more credible doctrine.
This one thing I beg of my reader: that he will
weigh each statement and evaluate it with a
mind innocent of prejudice and eager only for
the truth. (6.203–04)

Expressing concern that the anti-Trinitarian treatise is not likely to encounter either clemency or
open-mindedness, Milton’s petition for these
particular readerly qualities indicates the author’s
awareness of his heretical stance regarding the
Son. The prefatory project of placating an orthodox audience concludes with the conciliatory
gesture of seeking God’s assistance: “Now, relying on God’s help, let us come to grips with the
subject itself” (6.204).
The chapter that follows is one of the most
strenuously argued sections of the entire treatise,
occupying over fifty pages of the original manuscript and marshaling almost six hundred scriptural texts.4 Yet the extensive argument was
insufficient. One of Milton’s anonymous biographers (commonly believed to be his good
friend Cyriack Skinner) reports that the publication of Milton’s theological tracts was
prevented by the presence of “some speculative
points, differing perhaps from that commonly
receiv’d” (12). The “Epistle” to the treatise, the
preface to “On the Son of God,” and the work of
both Rumrich and Hill suggest that these “speculative points” impeding publication were none
other than the unorthodox tenets of the text’s
anti-Trinitarianism. Even though the Christian
Doctrine was composed to convey the fullness of
the gospel to “All the Churches of Christ and to
All in any part of the world who professes the
Christian Faith,” Milton was forced to conceal
—upon pain of imprisonment or possibly execution—his “dearest and best possession” because
his understanding of authorship and authority
eventuates in an idea of the Trinity intolerable to
the Anglican orthodoxy (6.117, 121). Bearing in
mind the foundation for Milton’s views on the
Godhead, we recognize in Milton’s costly refusal
to alter his opinion of the Son a total
commitment to the concept that acts of creation
determine and define supreme divinity.
Yet the same logic that leads Milton to exclude

the Son from equality with the Father also impels
him to exalt the Son in relation to other existents.
Although the Son’s status as creature disbars him
from being a supreme god, Milton insists that the
Son is superior to the rest of God’s works. As in
the case of the Son’s inferiority to the Father, the
Son’s superiority to the rest of creation grows out
of the specifics of the Son’s status vis-à-vis
creation. Subtle distinctions between his genesis
and that of the Father’s other creatures signal
great differences in authority. First, the Son can
claim absolute priority over all other existents:
“When the Son is said to be the first born of every
creature and, Rev. iii. 14, the beginning of God’s
creation, it is as plain as it could possibly be that
God voluntarily created or generated or produced
the Son before all things” (6.211). The Son precedes all of God’s other creatures, and this
priority places the Son in a position of privilege.
Second, the Son can claim a closer connection to
the Father than can other creatures, for he was
“begotten” while other creatures were simply
“created.” As Milton explains: “To Adam,
formed out of the dust, God was creator rather
than Father; but he was in a real sense Father of
the Son, whom he made of his own substance”
(6.209). Because begetting entails greater involvement and investment on the part of the Creator,
the Son’s unique mode of creation affords him
authority over those existents that do not enjoy
such an proximity to their universal Father.
The most important distinction between the
Son and all other existents, however, is the fact
that the Son assisted in the creation of all other
existents. As the Father’s agent in the formation
of the universe, the Son is the secondary creator
of the universe. And, given the intersection of
authorship and authority, this secondary position
is sufficient to install the Son in a position of
relative sovereignty. Although primarily indebted
to the Father for the gift of life, every existent
also indirectly owes its life to the Son. The
reverence rendered to the Son by all created
things, then, is secured by his role in their creation. Set apart by his identity as assistant in
universal creation and unique in his status as the
only begotten, the Son is sovereign among all
created things. The fact that the Son’s sovereignty
derives from his special relation to acts of creation should by now come as no surprise. The
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Son’s universal pre-eminence illustrates the way in
which Milton carefully considers the act of creation when calculating universal hierarchies and
structures of authority. Small distinctions in
authorship have eternal consequences in authority.
Within this theological framework, however,
the Son’s empowering participation in creation is
not entirely unproblematic. Because Milton is so
meticulous in his understanding of authorship as
the source of authority, he is forced to police the
processes of creation and propagation. If the
Father’s status as supreme God springs from his
role in creation, it is crucial that the Father alone
occupy that role. The Father must be sole creator
if he is to be sole sovereign. Consequently, Milton
must make careful distinctions in order to ensure
that all creation is attributed to the Father. The
task is somewhat tricky, for several scriptural
passages appear to declare that the world was
created by the Son. Accordingly, Milton expends
a great deal of effort reconstructing these passages in such a way as to diminish the Son’s significance in the genesis of the universe. Milton
explicitly owns up to this endeavor when he
claims that “I will now demonstrate that when
these things are ascribed to the Son, it is done in
such a way as to make it easily intelligible that
they should all be attributed primarily and
properly to the Father alone” (6.233).
In order to decrease the Son’s involvement in
creation, Milton strenuously emphasizes subtle
variations in prepositional phraseology:
Creation … is always qualified as being
through Christ; not by him, but by the Father.
(6.267)
“To be by the Father” and “to be through the
Son” are phrases which do not signify the same
kind of efficient cause. (6.301)
He from whom all things are is clearly distinguished
from him through whom all things are. (6.216)
The Father is not only he by whom, but also he
from whom, in whom, through whom, and on
account of whom all things are …. But the Son is
only he through whom all things are, and is
therefore the less principal cause. (6.302)
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Milton’s persistent italicizing testifies to the
weight he wants these prepositions to carry. But
the extensive addition of emphasis perhaps
undermines Milton’s very argument, suggesting
Milton’s need to produce through textual alteration the prepositional differences that he purports
to be readily perceptible to any reader. In any
case, the hard and fast distinctions that Milton
seeks to establish by way of prepositional structure prove troublesome in other ways as well. In
spite of Milton’s claim that creation is always
qualified in such a way as to differentiate the
Father from the Son, scriptural texts do not, in
fact, consistently employ different prepositions
when describing the creative behavior of the
Father and the Son. In these instances of overlapping diction, Milton tries to salvage his
theological position by arguing that the single
shared preposition bears two distinctly different
meanings. He claims that the preposition in
question signals a relationship of “primary” causation in some contexts, while in others it only
indicates “instrumental” or “less principal” causation. To determine which of these two different
meanings applies in any given passage, Milton
indicates that we need ask but one question: who
is doing the creating? If the sentence addresses
acts performed by the Father, then Milton insists
that the word must indicate primary causation. If
the sentence describes the deeds of anyone other
than the Father, then the word must indicate
secondary causation. The identity of the creating
subject is the only criterion that should be considered: “The preposition through, when referring to
the Father, indicates the prime cause (as in John
vi. 57: I live through the Father), and when referring
to the Son indicates the secondary and instrumental cause” (6.217).
In short, Milton employs a hermeneutics based
on backward reading. Instead of interpreting the
text in order to arrive at an eventual conclusion,
Milton decides upon the appropriate meaning
beforehand and then interprets the text in such a
way as to confirm this pre-fabricated conclusion.
Having ascertained that the only acceptable
meaning is one that makes God the Father the
primary cause and reduces everyone else to the
role of secondary assistant, Milton’s singular concern in any particular passage of scripture is to
choose the meaning of “through” that will pro-
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duce this state of affairs.
Milton is certainly not alone in this apparently
arbitrary interpretive stance.5 Indeed, one might
question whether biblical interpretation ever
proceeds in any direction other than backwards.
Nevertheless, the backwards-reading interpretive
stance that Milton openly adopts in issues of
creation constitutes an awkward deviation from
the deductive hermeneutic strategy that he elsewhere professes to be sole source of his idiosyncratic doctrine. As he declares on the title
page, Milton believes himself to be extracting
theology from scripture rather than imposing
theology onto scripture: “The Englishman John
Milton’s Two Books of Investigations into Christian Doctrine Drawn from the Sacred Scriptures
Alone” (6.125). Throughout the text Milton styles
himself the objective exegete, reading sacred texts
with utter disinterest and refusing to allow his
own desires to impinge upon his interpretation.
In fact, Milton’s attack on orthodox Trinitarians centers in the accusation that they interpret
the Bible in order to establish their doctrine rather
than allow the Bible to instruct them. In support
of this accusation, Milton points to the Trinitarian
claim that the word “God” indicates at times the
Father individually and at other times the triune
godhead collectively. Of the attempt to distinguish between these allegedly discrete meanings
of the single word “God,” Milton writes:
This distinction is, for various reasons, absurd.
Moreover, it is invented solely for the purpose
of supporting their theory, though in fact it
does not support it but is supported by it, so
that if you invalidate the theory, which you can
do merely by denying it, the worthless distinction vanishes at the same time. Indeed, the
distinction is not merely worthless but no
distinction at all. (6.224)

Milton’s dismissal of orthodox doctrine due to
the fact that it requires the same word to stand
for two different concepts seems eerily applicable
to his own deistic explications. Divining two
distinct modes of creation from the single word
“through”—a task Milton undertakes in this very
same chapter—Milton appears to be just as culpable as the Trinitarians of fabricating dubious
distinctions in support of theory.

Milton also takes issue with the way Trinitarians endeavor to establish their position by stressing the significance of the articles that either do
or do not precede the scriptural occurrences of
the titles of God. Once again, Milton’s rebuke
appears entirely pertinent to his own position and
the importance it affords prepositions:
Surely, where the very fundamentals of our
faith are at stake, we should not place our
confidence in something which has to be
forced or wrenched, so to speak, from passages dealing with a quite unrelated topic, in
which there are sometimes variant readings,
and where the meaning is questionable. Nor
should we believe in something which has to
be lured out from among articles and participles by some sort of verbal bird-catcher, or
which has to be dug out from a mass of
ambiguities and obscurities like the answers of
an oracle. (6.245–46)

The warning seems perfectly suited to Milton’s
own theology. Insisting on the difference between
“by” and “through”—as well as the difference
between “through” and “through”—Milton could
certainly be convicted of propounding a doctrine
that has to be “lured out” from the smallest parts
of speech.
Milton’s willingness to implement the interpretive stance he elsewhere excoriates stems from
his need to restrict creation to the Father. This
motive is clearly manifest in the moment when
Milton explains the difference between “by” and
“through”:
“To be by the Father” and “to be through the
Son” are phrases which do not signify the
same kind of efficient cause. If they are not of
the same kind, then there can be no question
of a joint cause, and if there is no joint cause
then “the Father by whom all things are” will
unquestionably be a more important cause
than “the Son through whom all things are.”
(6.301–302)

According to Milton, the two words must signify
different degrees of causation lest the Son be
considered a co-creator (“joint cause”) with the
Father. Sharing the Father’s creation is in turn
unacceptable, for this would compromise the
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Father’s status as the “more important cause”
and, consequently, compromise his status as the
universal sovereign.
The authority/authorship imperative that
molds the discussion of “by” and “through” similarly shapes the differentiation of “through” and
“through.” Milton explains that the problematic
preposition must at times mean something other
than principal causation because it otherwise
would imperil the Father’s primacy in creation.
Citing several scriptures that acclaim creation
“through” the Son, Milton declares that the preposition “does not denote the principal cause in
these passages, because if it did the Father himself, by whom all things are, would not be the
principal” (6.301). And, according to Milton’s
understanding of universal power structures, a
Father who is not principal would not be
supreme, and therefore would not be God.
Milton’s arduously argued heresies regarding the
Son of God, then, can be seen to come primarily
from his notion that divinity and domination
derive from creation.
The chapter in the Christian Doctrine that
addresses the third member of the orthodox
Trinity, the Holy Ghost, also takes shape according to Milton’s ideas of authorship and authority.
Predictably, Milton initiates his investigation by
examining the Holy Ghost’s beginnings. Milton
notes that the scriptures clearly declare that the
Son is begotten of the Father, but points out that
sacred texts are strangely silent about the origins
of the Holy Ghost: “The Bible … says nothing
about what the Holy Spirit is like, how it exists, or
where it comes from” (6.281). Because an existent
is situated in Milton’s schema according to its
means of existence, the enigmatic genesis of the
Holy Ghost produces a certain amount of uncertainty: “The spirit, then, is not said to be generated or created, and it cannot be decided, from
biblical evidence, how else it exists. So we must
leave the point open, since the sacred writers are
so non-committal about it” (6.281–82).
Milton has difficulty inhabiting this openendedness in relation to the Holy Ghost, however, for the role that the Holy Ghost seems to
play in creation potentially compromises the
Father’s omnific identity. As was the case with
the Son, creative acts attributed to the Holy
Ghost endanger the Father’s sovereignty and
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must therefore be contained. In order to eradicate
the risk the Holy Spirit represents as a rival or cocreator, Milton insists that passages crediting the
Holy Ghost with creation really refer not to the
Holy Ghost but to the Father. When Genesis
explains that the world emerges after “the spirit
of God brooded” upon the waters, for example,
Milton argues that we are intended to identify
“the spirit of God” not with a third member of
the godhead but rather with “the power and
virtue of the Father” (6.282). Similarly, when
Matthew claims that the child Mary conceives “is
of the holy spirit,” we are to supposed to understand that “under the gospel the term ‘spirit of
God’ or ‘holy spirit’ sometimes means the Father
himself” (6.283). In order to confirm the Father
in his authoritative identity as sole creator, Milton
must at times empty out the idea of the Holy
Ghost, erasing the entity and turning the title into
a simple epithet straightforwardly signifying “the
Father.”
Milton cannot completely overlook the existent
known as the Holy Ghost, however, and eventually admits that “ultimately, ‘spirit’ can mean the
actual person of the Holy Spirit, or its symbol”
(6.285). As a result of the Holy Ghost’s potential
as a counter-creator or alter-author, Milton is
quick to assert its inferiority in those rare instances when he does allow the Holy Ghost an individual identity. But Milton finds it somewhat difficult to logically establish this inferiority, for the
Holy Ghost—as Milton has earlier explained—is
not explicitly identified as a creature of God. Because it is not certain that the Holy Ghost owes
its existence to the Father, Milton cannot conclude that the Holy Ghost thereby owes to the
Father the submissiveness of a son/creature. Perplexed by his inability to insert the Holy Ghost
into a structure of authorship and authority, Milton must momentarily abandon his model of
universal government and insist upon an inferiority that he cannot explain:
As the above passages comprise just about all
we are told in express terms about the Holy
Spirit, they also represent all we can or ought
to know on the subject. What they amount to
is this: the Holy Spirit, unlike the Son, is
nowhere said to have submitted himself to any
mediatorial function. He is nowhere said to be

242

MILTON QUARTERLY

under an obligation, as a son is, to pay obedience to the Father. Nevertheless he is obviously inferior to both the Father and the
Son, inasmuch as he is represented as being
and is said to be subservient and obedient in
all things. (6.288)

Milton has established the Son’s submission to
the Father by showing him to be a creature of the
Father, but he cannot do the same for the Holy
Ghost. Unable to assert the Holy Ghost’s status
as a creature of God, Milton has no logical
grounds upon which to base the Holy Ghost’s
submission. The “nevertheless” of this passage
marks the momentary lapse of logic: with the
word Milton recognizes that his assertion of the
Holy Ghost’s submission does not follow from
the preceding facts but resolves to make the
unwarranted assertion “nevertheless.” After leaping over this aporia in his argument, Milton tries
to justify his estimation of the Holy Ghost’s
subordination by any means available. The Holy
Ghost must be subordinate to the Father, Milton
eventually insists, because it always acts as if it
were subordinate: “He is obviously inferior to
both the Father and the Son, inasmuch as he is
represented as being and is said to be subservient
and obedient in all things.”
Grounded in the Holy Spirit’s apparently inviolable allegiance to the Father, Milton is able to
resume his rigorous understanding of authority as
derivative of authorship. If God’s sovereignty
stems from creation and if the Holy Ghost recognizes God as sovereign, then the Holy Ghost
must be a creature of God. Because Milton construes authority exclusively in terms of authorship, the fact that the Father wields authority over
the Holy Ghost constitutes compelling proof that
the Father authored the Holy Ghost. Although
Milton has opened the chapter on the Holy
Ghost with the emphatic claim that it is impossible to ascertain the Holy Ghost’s origins, he
concludes the chapter by boldly contradicting his
own claim. He not only asserts that the Father
created the Holy Ghost but also speculates as to
the chronology of this creation:
The Holy Spirit, since he is a minister of God,
and therefore a creature, was created, that is,
produced, from the substance of God …

maybe before the foundations of the world
were laid, but after the Son, to whom he is far
inferior, was made. (6.298)

This startling reversal regarding the generation of
the Holy Spirit arises from Milton’s certainty that
authority corresponds with authorship. Since the
Holy Ghost is a minister of God, it must therefore be a creature. And since the Holy Ghost is
inferior to the Son, it must therefore have been
created after the Son.
In “Of the Holy Spirit,” then, Milton reverses
the rhetorical direction of “Of the Son of God.”
In the chapter on the Son, Milton establishes that
the Son is created by the Father and uses this
datum to prove that the Son is therefore inferior
to the Father. In the chapter on the Holy Ghost,
Milton establishes that the Holy Ghost is inferior
to the Father and uses this datum to prove that
the Holy Ghost is therefore a creature of the
Father. In complementary ways, both chapters
witness the way in which Milton’s monistic conception of universal government is founded upon
notions of authorship. For Milton, structures of
domination and subordination are entirely determined (and determinable) by acts of creation. It is
perhaps no exaggeration to claim that creation is
at the epicenter of Milton’s theology.
Once we recognize the role that creation plays
in Milton’s theology, we are better able to understand the role that creation plays in Milton’s
poetry. In spite of the fact that we have not fully
grasped the theological imperatives that produce
this state of affairs, Miltonists have nevertheless
noticed that Milton’s poetry is intensely interested
in the processes of life-giving. Some fifty years
ago Kester Svendsen observed that
Fecundity and creativity … form a dominant
motif in Paradise Lost in the opposition of
Christ and Satan. The emergence of life from
the dust of the earth, the origin of Adam and
Eve, the dynamic opulence of the garden, indeed, the whole narrative, symbolize the
struggle between positive and negative creativity. (187–88)

Critics have been quick to expound upon
Svendsen’s observation, commenting at length on
the centrality of creation in Milton’s verse. As
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Michael Lieb points out: “Creation is so important to the action of Paradise Lost, [that] most
scholars have had something to say about its
presence in Milton’s epic” (10 n.10). Lieb’s own
book-length engagement with Milton’s epic is
initiated by the insight that “the idea of creation
in all its aspects” serves as the “common referent
by which the oppositions of the poem find expression” (7). I maintain that it is no accident that
creation occupies such a central position in Milton’s poetry. More than a convenient trope or a
compelling metaphor, creation is in many ways
the bedrock of Miltonic thought. Milton’s verse,
like his theology, centers in creative acts because
Milton’s materialist monism compels him to
define divinity in terms of creation. Creation is
crucial—in both the poetry and the prose—for
deity depends upon it.
Duke University

NOTES
I would like to thank David Aers, Leigh DeNeef,
Maureen Quilligan, and Laurie Shannon for commenting on earlier drafts of this essay.
1

All references to Milton’s prose come from the
Complete Prose Works.
2
In De Trinitate, Augustine also invokes the categories of creature and creator in reference to
God’s sovereignty. Augustine’s usage, however,
differs significantly from Milton’s. In Milton’s
theology, a subject’s status as creator or creature
has no substantial importance, for creator and
creature alike share the same substance. In
Augustine’s outlook, however, a subject’s creational condition has everything to do with
substance. According to Augustine, there is a
“substance of the creature” and a “substance of
the Creator.” It is these various substances that
Augustine has in mind when using the terms

243

“creator” and “creature.” In 1.6.9, for instance,
Augustine uses the term “creature” to refer to
“every substance which is not God.” Later in the
passage, it is clear that Augustine’s claim that the
Son is “not a creature” aims at nothing other than
establishing that the Son does not possess the
“substance of the creature” but rather the
“substance of the Creator.” The Son’s status as
“uncreated” is meaningful for Augustine because
it indicates that the Son “is of the same substance
with the Father” (1.6.9). In other words, the
terms “creator” and “creature” are significant for
Augustine only insofar as they express different
substantial states. Even when he refers to acts of
creation, Augustine continues to be concerned
primarily with “the metaphysics of substance.”
3
The precise nature of Milton’s antiTrinitarianism as well as its position in relation to
early modern Anglican orthodoxy is, of course, a
source of considerable contention. In Bright Essence William B. Hunter, C.A. Patrides, and J.H.
Adamson argue that Milton’s stance in regards to
the Son is simply an innocuous form of “subordinationism” easily accommodated within orthodox models of the Godhead. In “Milton’s Arianism: Why It Matters,” however, John Rumrich
contends that “subordinationism” is a term both
meaningless and anachronistic to studies of
Milton. Rumrich argues instead that Milton’s
theology aligns him with a heretical form of antiTrinitarianism identified in Milton’s time by the
term “Arian.” Michael Bauman’s book-length
study, Milton’s Arianism, exhaustively and persuasively confirms Rumrich’s claim. As the present
essay suggests, I side with Bauman and Rumrich.
4
The disproportionate length of Chapter 5 is seen
in the fact that each of the other 50 chapters
averages only 14 manuscript pages in length.
5

Other backwards-reading theologians include,
among others, St. Augustine. In his own De Doctrina Christiana (translated as On Christian Teaching),
Augustine explains that sometimes scripture must
be taken literally and sometimes it must be taken
figuratively. In matters of literality or metaphoricality, Augustine urges an approach akin to
Milton’s approach in the case of creation. Augustine’s interpretation, like Milton’s, is guided by
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certain pre-conceived ideas. He begins with the
desired meaning and then interprets the text in
such a way as to yield that desired meaning:
In dealing with figurative expressions we will
observe a rule of this kind: the passage being
read should be studied with careful consideration until its interpretation can be connected with the realm of love. If this point is
made literally, then no kind of figurative
expression need be considered. If the expression is a prescriptive one, and either forbids
wickedness or wrongdoing, or enjoins selfinterest or kindness, it is not figurative. But if
it appears to enjoin wickedness or wrongdoing
or to forbid self-interest or kindness, it is
figurative. (3.54–55)

In short, Augustine also reads backwards. Instead
of interpreting texts to arrive at an eventual
meaning, Augustine openly allows an alreadyarrived-at meaning to shape his textual interpretation.
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